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Abstract
The various labor laws enacted in Japan in the Occupation era, and still in effect today without
substantial amendment, legitimized unions, both as bargaining units on behalf of the employees of
large companies and as political organizations, but prohibited strikes by public employees, and did
not lead to the establishment of valuablelabor monopolies.  The effective bargaining units in wage
negotiations in Japan are mostly enterprise unions, whose respective members are employees of a
given company.  This does not preclude their having succeeded in raising members' wages.  Japan’s
infrequency and short duration of strikes is a poor indication of the effectiveness of its labor unions
at obtaining higher wages for their members.  The smallness of losses due to strikes in Japan means
only that there is little discrepancy between the unions’ and employers’ information regarding the
employers’ maximum willingness to pay a premium for union members’ services.  It does not
necessarily mean that the premium itself is small.  Enterprise union members in Japan mostly include
the regular employees of large firms, trained in company-specific skills and expectant of long ultimate
tenures of service.  Compared to members of a typical industry-wide union in the U.S. or elsewhere,
the members of a Japanese enterprise union are relatively homogeneous and have had a longer time
in which to observe the behavior of their employer.  For both these reasons, it is quite natural to
suppose that union members in Japan should be relatively well-informed regarding their employers’
willingness to pay a premium for their services.
*Much of this paper is culled from: David Flath, Jap neseEconomy, Oxford University Press,
forthcoming.
1Japan’s Labor Unions
Japanese labor relations exhibit two distinctive characteristics, possibly related to one another.
The first one is that the typical Japanese labor union collects the employees of a single firm, not
employees of different firms in the same industry or workers of similar crafts employed in different
industries.  That is, most Japanese labor unions are enterpriseunions, not industry-wide unions or
craft unions.  The second distinctive feature is that the percent of total working time lost due to
strikes is far less in Japan than in most other nations.  The key questions about Japan’s labor unions
center on the underlying reasons for the two distinctive aspects just mentioned, and on whether the
distinctive features necessarily mean that the Japanese unions are ineffective at protecting workers’
interests.  A further issue is the precise interrelation between enterprise unions and Japan’s other
employment practices, for union members in Japan are mostly the permanent employees of the large
firms, exactly the same workers most subject to lifetime employment and seniority-based wages.
The history of Japan’s labor union movement before 1945 was not a happy one.  In the
absence of effective legal protection, unions enjoyed little success.  The prewar unionization rate
peaked in 1931, when only eight percent of Japan’s industrial workers belonged to unions, and these
were relatively concentrated in smaller firms.  The military-dominated governments of the 1930's
regarded the labor movement as political anathema and imprisoned many of the union leaders.  Japan's
ruling government banned labor unions altogether in 1940, the same year it abolished political parties,
and the ban remained in effect at the war's end.
The office of SCAP, under instruction from Washington, took early steps to encourage labor
unions.  The aim of the Americans was partly political.  Labor unions with elected leaders afford an
outlet for free political expression, even where the official organs of government are not democratic.
But labor unions, of course, serve an economic purpose as well as a political one.  The economic
purpose of unions is to extract higher wages for members, by first either effecting contrived scarcities
of labor services, or providing valued services, and then bargaining successfully for a share in the
resulting economic rent.  The valuable services that unions can provide include collective negotiation
of employment contracts, monitoring of employers' compliance with such contracts, and identification
of skilled and disciplined workers.  Whether unions monopolize labor or provide valuable services,
their insistence on higher wages for members will achieve little unless it is buttressed by the credible
threat to impose losses on a recalcitrant employer by striking.  The Japanese labor laws that were
enacted in the Occupation era and remain in effect today without substantial amendment, did establish
the legitimacy of strikes.
Labor Legislation
In every country where unions have succeeded economically, unions' right to strike is legally
protected.  In Japan, Article 17 of the Police Regulations enacted in 1900, did exactly the opposite,
explicitly outlawing coercive acts connected with strikes and barring union organizing activities.  As
interpreted by the courts and law enforcement officials, this amounted to a blanket prohibition of
strikes.  But strikes did occur anyway.  In spite of Article 17, in the first two decades of this century,
Japanese labor unions did organize selected industries including the merchant marine, railroad
     1Japanese labor unions and their supporters both in the government bureaucracy and in the
political parties including the kenseikai-minseitÇ, s ruggled unsuccessfully throughout the prewar era
to legitimize  union strike activity.  These events are described in detail  by: Sheldon Garon, The State
and Labor in Modern Japan, University of California Press, 1987.
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operation, printing, and coal mining.  These same industries were among the earliest to be unionized
in America and Europe.  They are all industries in which strikes are particularly costly to employers,
either because workers represent a unique resource (those who reside near a mine) or exhibit unique
skills and are therefore not easily replaced (printers, locomotive engineers), or industries in which
employers are dependent on unions to identify productive workers (a ship's operators are often a
motley crew).
In the World War I economic boom, Japanese labor unions gained economic strength from
the expanded demand for industrial labor.  Strike activity also increased even though it frequently
meant incarceration of union leaders.  The growing economic strength of unions led to political
concessions.  In July 1926, the Diet repealed Article 17 and enacted a new law providing for police
conciliation of labor disputes. This statute was a step towards legitimizing unions, but interfered little
with union busting dismissals by employers.  Under this regime, Japanese labor unions mainly
succeeded in organizing some of the workers in small firms.  Union membership as a percentage of
the industrial workforce peaked in 1931 at a mere eight percent.  The minseiÇ administration of
Hamaguchi, in 1929 and 1931, proposed additional labor legislation that would have gone farther to
protect unions' right to strike, and to organize the employees of large firms, but failed to enact it.1
The subsequent  Japanese administrations regarded the socialistic political agenda of the leading
unions as anathema, and imprisoned many of the leaders.  In November 1940, the second Konoe
administration abolished independent labor unions altogether, and, at the same stroke, itself organized
all industrial workers into company-by-company political cells called sangyÇ hÇkokukai (or sanpÇ for
short; lit. "industrial patriotic associations").  These cells, as intended, completely preempted the
formation of autonomous labor unions, suppressing labor disputes in order to advance the war effort.
The sanpÇ assocations of Japan were explicitly modeled on the German Nazi government's labor
associations known as the National Labor Front.  At the war's end, no effective independent labor
unions existed in Japan.  Ending this state of affairs became an early priority of  SCAP.
Under the broad guidance of SCAP, Japan's Diet enacted three basic laws pertaining to labor
unions and industrial relations.  The Labor Union Law, enacted December 1945, officially  recognizes
labor unions with elected leaders as the collective bargaining agents of  their voluntary members, and
explicitly recognizes a right-to-strike.  For example, it disallows employers from collecting
indemnities from unionized workers to compensate for the employer's own losses due to strikes. The
law also disallows employers from discriminating against workers who participate in unions.  It spo
facto extends the terms of union agreements to other employees of the same factory if three-fourths
of the employees are  members of the particular union.  Finally, it provides for national and
prefectural labor relations commissions, staffed by appointees of the government, to conciliate,
mediate and arbitrate labor disputes, including those arising from employee complaints of unfair
practices such as employer discrimination against union members.
The Labor Relations Adjustment Law, enacted September 1946, details the procedures for
the labor relations commissions to follow in conciliating, mediating and arbitrating labor disputes, of
3which there had been quite a large number in the months since the Labor Union Law took effect.
Under the terms of this statute, conciliation entails the participation in negotiations of a presumably
impartial, but expert, third party, chosen from a panel appointed by the relevant labor relations
commission.  Also under the terms of the Labor Relations Adjustment Law, mediation is the proposal
of resolution of a labor dispute by an appointed panel, some members of which represent employers
and some who represent workers.  The recommendations of a mediation committee are non-binding.
The disputing parties themselves, may, in the end, choose to disregard them.  Finally, arbitration
entails the referral of a labor dispute to a three-person committee designated by the relevant labor
relations commission and agreed upon by both disputants, and which, after consideration of the
matter, issues a binding recommendation.  Besides these stipulations, the Labor Relations Adjustment
Law also prohibited strikes by policemen, firemen, government bureaucrats and the like.  In July
1948, this was broadened (by ordinance 201) to prohibit strikes by all public employees including the
workers in government enterprises, the largest of which was the national railroad.  These strike
prohibitions were subsequently made permanent by amendments of the National Public Service Law
(December 1950) and Public Corporations Labor Relations Law (July 1952).
The last of the three basic labor laws of the Occupation era, the Labor Standards Law,
enacted April 1947, stipulates terms of employment including 25% added wages for overtime work
(initially, that in excess of eight hours in a day, sixdays in a week).  It establishes a mechanism for
imposing legal minimum wage stipulations.  It prohibits child labor. It provides for thirty day notice
of dismissal. It provides for employer compensation for on-the-job accidents, and requires that
minimal standards of workplace safety and sanitation be observed.
Besides the three laws just described, the new Constitution, promulgated in November 1946,
includes a stipulation (Article 28) guaranteeing "the right of workers to organize and to bargain and
to act collectively".  Whether this stipulation carries any force is unclear.  For instance, the
prohibitions against strikes by government employees have been upheld by the courts in Japan, Article
28 notwithstanding.
Unionization of workers in Japan proceeded quite rapidly immediately following the
December 1945 implementation of the Labor Union Law.  By year's end 1949, 55.8% of the nation's
non-farm labor force belonged to unions, of which there existed 34,688 in Japan.  By 1955, the
unionized fraction of the industrial workforce had declined to around one-third, where it remained
until the mid-1970's.  Since then, unionization has steadily decreased in Japan.  Currently, about one-
fourth of Japan’s industrial workforce are union members.  Most of the unions formed from 1946-
1949 simply organized the employees of a single company or business establishment.  They could
therefore be described, for the most part, as enterprise unions, and not industrial unions or craft
unions.  Many of these unions joined together in national confederations, but more did not.  In the
early postwar years, two national confederations of labor unions, in particular, vied with one another
for national prominence.  The one known as sanbet u (shorthand for zennihon sangyÇbetsu rÇdÇ
kumiai kaigi, lit. "Japan-wide congress of industrial unions") was closely allied with the Communist
Party, while its main rival, originally known as sÇdÇmei(short for nihon rÇdÇ kumiai sÇdÇmei, lit.
"confederation f Japanese labor unions") was allied with the Democratic Socialist Party (not to be
confused with the larger, Japan Socialist Party).  The purposes of sanbet u and sÇdÇmei were to
advance national political agendas, not to organize workers into broader collective bargaining units
than one enterprise.
The high water mark of the national confederations of labor unions came when sanbetsu
4called for a general strike to occur on February 1, 1947, and was joined by its main rival  sÇdÇmei and
by a number of large, unaffiliated, public employees' unions.  In all, labor leaders claiming to represent
about wo-thirds of Japan's nonfarm labor force, joined the call for a general strike.  Their demands
included not only wage hikes for public employees, but the resignation of the Yoshida cabinet.  The
situation became especially tense when, two weeks before the strike date, the president of sanbetsu
was mortally wounded in an attempted assassination.  The strike never occurred.  At the very last
moment MacArthur issued a directive prohibiting it, and the vast majority of workers complied with
the directive.  Afterwards, sanbetsu shrank to insignificance.  SÇdÇmei, too, suffered diminished ranks
and in 1954 merged with several other national labor organizations to form dÇmei (short for zen-
nihon rÇdÇ kumiai sÇdÇmei, lit. "Japan-wide confederation of labor unions").  DÇmei was for a long
time the second largest national labor organization in Japan. The largest was sÇhyÇ, (short for nihon
rÇdÇ kumiai sÇhyÇgikai, lit. "general council of Japanese labor unions"), formed in March 1950, its
ranks greatly swelled in reaction to the so-called "red purge" of June 1950 that it opposed, in which
thousands of persons identified as Communists were barred from private employment.  Communists
had been purged from the civil service the previous year.  In 1987, dÇmeimerged with another labor
federation to form a new organization known as rengÇ, which in 1989 also absorbed sÇhyÇ. The full
name of rengÇ is now: nihon rÇdÇ kumiai sÇ-rengÇ kai (lit. "general alliance of Japanese labor
unions").
The rationale and essential activities of the national confederations have always been political,
and they have not been very effective.  SÇhyÇ, and since 1987 rengÇ, have  been the main supporters
of the Japan Socialist Party, for many years the leading opposition party in Japan.  The Japan Socialist
Party has only formed two cabinets in the entire postwar period, the Katayama Tetsu cabinet of 1947,
and the coalition cabinet led by Murayama Tomiichi, 1994-95.  The real political battles in
contemporary Japan have mainly occurred within the ranks of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
which despite its name is rather conservative, not very sympathetic to labor unions.  The LDP was
formed in 1955 by the merger of the Liberal Party led by Yoshida with the Democratic Party, the
leading conservative opposition party, led by Hatoyama IchirÇ, successor to Yoshida as Prime
Minister, 1954-56.  The LDP prevailed in every general election from the time of its formation until
1993, when the party fragmented over the issue of money scandals.  In other words, the leftist
political parties supported by organized labor in Japan have been largely shut out of the government.
Nature and Extent of Unionization in Japan
Japanese labor unions have evolved within the framework of the laws described in the
preceding section, and they are, overwhelmingly, enterprise unions.  They organize the employees
of a single company, or of merely one plant within a company. As Table 1 shows, more than 90
percent of union members in Japan belong to enterprise unions.  These are not mere “locals” of larger
unions.  They enjoy (or “endure”, depending on how one views it) complete autonomy in bargaining.
As discussed in the preceding section, Japan’s national confederations of labor unions (of which
currently the largest by far is the one known as rengÇ (lit. “the alliance”)), have mainly concerned
themselves with national politics, not with collective bargaining or strike activity.  The national
confederations are not therefore proper analogues of the industry-wide unions of other nations, such
as America’s United Auto Workers’ Union,ted Mineworkers’ Union, or Steelworkers’ Union.
     2The conjecture and its supporting evidence are both based on the following study: Richard B.
Freeman and Marcus E. Rebick, “Crumbling Pillar? Declining Union Density in Japan”, Journal of
Japanese and International Economies, 3, 1989, pp. 578-605.
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The only large industry-wide union in Japan isthe Seamen’s Union.  The unions of public workers
also exhibit some aspects of industry-wide unions, but are classified as enterprise unions.  These
include the Japan Railway Workers’ Union, Telecommunication Workers’ Union, Postal Workers’
Union, Teachers’ Union, and Municipal Workers’ Union.  There are no large craft unions in Japan.
The few union members identified in the table as belonging to “other” types of unions are, for the
most part, casual day-laborers registered at government unemployment insurance offices, and who
belong to the Day-Workers’s Union, a large union that does ot fi easily into the other categories.
Table  1. Composition of Union Membership in Japan by Type of Union,
1930-1988.
 
 1930 1947 1964 1975 1988 1995
Percent of all union 
members belonging to
each type:
Enterprise Unions  36  82  91  91  91
Industrial Unions  46   6   5   5   4
Craft Unions   7  10   1   1     3
Other  10     2   3   2   2
All unions       100 100 100 100 100
millions of persons .35 6.27 9.65 12.47 12.16 12.61
pct of labor force 1.2% 18.0% 20.5% 23.4% 19.7% 18.9%
Sources. Ministry of Labor, Trade Unions Basic Survey ; and David E. Weinstein,
“United  We Stand: Firms and Enterprise Unions in Japan”, Journa l of Japanese and
International  Economies ,  vol. 8, 1994, Table 1, p. 55 (Wienstein’s primary
sources:  RodÇ kumiai kihon ch Çsa 30 nen shi  (30 year history of the trade unions
basic  survey); and Nihon no rod Ç kumiai no genj Ç (State of labor unions in
Japan).
The bottom row of Table 1 indicates some of the movements in the overall unionization rate
of Japan.  The great xpansion in unionization after enactment of the labor laws is evident, as is the
more recent secular decline in unionization.  As Table 2 illustrates, unionization rates of other
developed nations, and not only Japan, declined in the last decade.  Perhaps the slowing of
macroeconomic growth since the mid-1970's has stiffened management resistence to union organizing
efforts.  In support of such a conjecture, the decline in unionization in Japan since 1975, largely
mirrors a drop in the rate at which unions have organized the workers in new establishments.  It is
not simply the result of a shifting pattern of employment across industries, towards the less unionized
sectors.2   
     3In the U.S., a “bargaining unit” is a set of workers designated by the government commission
known as the National Labor Relations Board, to be a domain for union representation elections and
collective bargaining.
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Table 2. Union Membership in Japan and Other Nations, 1970-1990. 
           Union membership   Coverage
                                 (percent of 
          (percent of wage        workers covered 
           and salary earners)    by union 
            1970 1980 1990      contracts)
France  22  18  10      92 (1985)
US  23  22  16      18 (1990)
JAPAN  35  31  25      23 (1985)
Germany  33  45  33      90 (1985)
Canada  31  36  36      38 (1990)
Italy  36  49  39      not available
UK  45  50  39      47 (1990)
Source:  OECD, Employment Outlook  (1994), Table 5.7, p.184, and Table 5.8, p. 185.
Currently, Japan’s overall unionization rate lies in the mid-range for developed nations.
Japan’s percentage of industrial workers belonging to unions is more than that of the U.S. but less
than that of some European countries.  But the last column of Table 2 reveals a way in which Japan
is distinctive.  In some nations, Germany and France in particular, many workers who are not union
members are nevertheless covered by labor contracts negotiated by unions.  In Japan, however,
matters are actually reversed; fewer workers are covered by union contracts than are union members.
In Germany, union organizing activity is afforded only weak legal protection but industry-wide
negotiation of labor contracts is enshrined in law and amounts to monopsonistic cartelization of
employers in the respective industries.  In France, dejure extension of selected terms of union labor
contracts to non-union employees in the same firms, industries, or regions is pervasive even though
unionization itself is quite low.  Extension mechanisms like those of Germany or France actually
discourage union membership.  Why pay union dues if one obtains no special benefits from
membership? As already mentioned, the Labor Union Law of Japan ipso f cto extends the terms of
union agreements to other employees of the same factory if three-fourths of the employees are
members of the particular union.  The analogous stipulation of the relevant U.S. statute (the Wagner
Act), requires that a simple majority of workers in the same “bargaining unit” vote by secret ballot
in favor of exclusive representation by one union.3  The extension of the terms of union labor
contracts o non-members is thus significantly weaker in Japan than in the U.S..  Almost all of Japan’s
incumbent enterprise unions organize far more than the three-fourths needed for extension of
coverage to other employees of their same unit, which is often an establishment only, not an entire
     4William B. Gould IV, Japan’s Reshaping of American Labor Law, The MIT Press, 1984.  See
in particular the discussion on pp.37-38. Also see: Richard B. Freeman and Marcus E. Rebick,
“Crumbling Pillar? Declining Union Density in Japan”, Journalof Japanese and International
Economies, 3, 1989, pp. 578-605, especially pp. 589-592.
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firm.  In spite of that, the three-fourths rule, compared to America’s one-half rule,  may well have
impeded efforts to organize any new union not favored by management.  This difference between
American and Japanese labor law may account for the fact that industry-wide unions, although
opposed by employers, could still form in the U.S., but only enterprise unions could form in Japan;
employer resistence to industry-wide unions was more effective in Japan.4  This rather begs the
question as to why these legal stipulations were allowed to persist in the respective nations.  An
appealing conjecture is that Japan’s labor laws and its tendency to form enterprise unions are both
subject to the same economic forces, the prevalence of company-specific skills at large firms.
Japan’s unions tend to organize the employees of large firms, not small ones.  Thus, industries
with large firms like mining, public utilities, and heavy manufacturing industries are the most
unionized in Japan, and wholesaling, retailing, agriculture and the construction industry are the least
unionized.  The Table 3 illustrates the profound difference in unionization across firms of differing
sizes in Japan.  Quite apparently, the typical union member in Japan is the permanent employee of a
large manufacturing firm.  And few such employees are not members of an enterprise union.  These
are exactly the same workers most subject to lifetime employment and seniority-based wages.  This
fact  underlies explanations for Japan’s tendency to form enterprise unions rather than industry-wide
unions or craft unions.
8Table 3. Unionization in Japan by Firm Size and Industry, 1991.
Number of union members in thousands (and union
 members as a percentage of all employees)
                                               
       Employees per firm 
                                 
300 less
Total or more 30-299 than 30
Agriculture, Forestry 
 and Fishery    51(19.7)    4(44.4)    1(0.1)   16(10.3)
Mining    17(21.8)   13(72.2)    3(0.8)    1( 2.2)
Construction   886(16.8)  249(64.0)   20(0.1)  597(16.9)
Manufacturing  3977(28.2) 2908(63.1)  555(0.7)  106( 2.1)
Electric, Gas, 
 Heating, and Water   225(71.9)  159(100)     5(0.2)      4( 6.1)
Transport and 
 Telecommunications  1645(44.7) 1009(100)   245(0.9)  127(11.4)
Wholesaling, Retailing
 and Restaurants  1089( 6.4)  854(91.2)  174(0.3)    60( 0.5)
Finance and Insurance  1171(56.2) 1116(100)    43(0.3)    3( 0.4)
Real Estate    17( 1.8)   12(22.2)    5(0.2)    1( 0.1)
Services  1888(12.9)  529(18.7)  329(0.4)   87( 1.2)
Public Administration  1322(74.4)  ---  ---    ---
All Industries  12323(20.5) 7253(64.5) 1380(0.4) 1036( 3.3)
Source: Nihon no t Çkei (1992/93)table 69, p. 49 and table 74 p. 56.
Rationale and Implications of Enterprise Unionism in Japan
The goals of a labor union include both the economic enrichment of its members, and
expansion of its ranks.  These two goals often conflict with one another, for union wages can
generally be raised by constricting employment, that is, monopolizing the supply of labor and effecting
a contrived scarcity of it.  But unions can also perform actions that increase the demand for their
members’ ervices, which would, in principle, allow both higher wages and expanded employment.
Actions that a union can perform to enlarge the demand for its members’ services include providing
services that facilitate negotiation and enforcement of efficient labor contracts.  The services might
have to do with the screening of job applicants (Here one thinks of the internationally ubiquitous
union hiring hall for seamen).  Also, collective negotiation of contracts may afford cost savings when
compared to case-by-case negotiations.  Grievance procedures and other such contract monitoring
activities are also logically subject to economies of scale.  Unions that perform these services thus
enlarge the effective demand for labor.  Additionally, David Weinstein has pointed out that an
enterprise union might actually induce an enlarged demand for its members’ services merely by
insisting upon expanded employment, if, as in the Cournot model, it causes the firm’s oligopolistic
     5David Weinstein, “United We Stand: Firms and Enterprise Unions in Japan”, Journal of the
Japanese and International Economies, vol. 8, 1994, pp. 53-71.  The Cournot model on which
Weinstein’s model turns, the standard model for the behavior of manufacturing oligopolies, presumes
that firms in the same industry choose outputs to maximize their own respective profits, given the
imputed output decisions of rivals.  If a union labor contract “forces” enlarged output by one firm,
it reduces the profit-maximizing outputs of the others, who thus concede a larger share of the industry
output and profit to the one. 
     6Giorgio Brunello, “The Effect of Unions on Firm Performance in Japanese Manufacturing”,
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 45, no. 3, April 1992, pp. 471-487.
     7Nakamura Kasuke, Sato Hiroshige, and Kamiya Takatoshi, rÇdÇ kumiai wa, hontÇ i yaku ni
tatteiru no ka: (Do labor unions really have a useful role?) SÇgÇ RÇdÇ Kenkyãjo, 1988.  The authors
surveyed small and medium manufacturing firms in the Tokyo area in 1982.
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rivals to shrink their outputs.5  Of course the enterprise unions of the rival firms will adopt the same
ploy, greatly reducing the overall effectiveness of each’s insistence upon expanded employment as
a way of increasing their employers’ willingness to pay for labor services--the situation resembles an
arms race that none win but that none can avoid.
The preceding discussion opens a range of possible implications of Japan’s enterprise unions.
As labor monopolies, the unions would have constricted employment and raised the wages in the
unionized sector.  As suppliers of valuable services they would have expanded employment in the
unionized sector, and, by bargaining effectively for a share of the resulting benefits, raised the wage
rate.  Finally, as adjuncts to the oligopolistic rivalry of the large firms, enterprise unions would have
expanded the output and employment in unionized industries, but without necessarily raising the wage
rate, or without raising it by much.  Direct evidence pertaining to Japanese unions’ effects on wages
and employment is scant.  Because nearly all of the large employers in Japan and few of the small
employers confront enterprise unions, it is most difficult to distinguish a union wage effect from a
firm-size ffect.  One study by Giorgio Brunello6 examining mostly small and medium-sized Japanese
manufacturing firms, however, did find that unionized firms tended to achieve much smaller profit
to sales ratios, slightly smaller rates of return on equity, and much smaller value-added per worker
than did similar but non-unionized firms in the same industries.  Another study by a team of Japanese
labor economists7 found that unionization in small and medium sized manufacturing firms tended to
be associated with enlarged bonuses and severance pay, higher wages for female employees, and
increased inclination of employees to refrain from working on paid holidays.   While hardly
conclusive, these two studies, together, support the finding that Japan’s enterprise unions enlarge
wages and reduce their employing firms’ profits.  The unions-as-labor-monopolies story receives
qualified support.
An enterprise union is not a valuable monopoly of general labor but is, potentially, a valuable
monopoly of the services of workers with skills specific to the one company.  Quite arguably, lifetime
employment and seniority-based wages evolved in Japan to promote the acquisition of company-
specific skills and to discourage shirking by workers who, having acquired such skills, were unlikely
to be dismissed.  The fact that the employees of the large manufacturing firms in Japan are the locus
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of these practices and also the most unionized, reinforces the idea that investment in company-specific
skills gave rise to union labor monopolies in Japan at the enterprise level.  Industry-wide labor
monopolies would of course be more valuable than enterprise labor monopolies, but not by enough
in Japan, where enterprise labor monopolies are themselves relatively valuable, to overcome employer
resistence or political opposition to the needed adjustments in labor laws.  None of this precludes
Japan’s enterprise unions having actually provided valuable contract enforcement services.  And here
also, the employment practices of large firms have a significant bearing.  Labor contracts assuring that
workers have efficient incentives to acquire company-specific skills and avoid shirking, necessarily
depend upon the workers’ belief that the employer will fulfill promises to compensate them late in
their careers for services rendered earlier.  An enterprise union that can hold an employer to account
strengthens workers’ credence in these implicitly long-term labor contracts, to the enrichment of both
employer and workers.
Whether a union effects a contrived scarcity of labor services, or enlarges the employer’s
effective demand for those services, its members will obtain little of the resulting economic rent unless
it can bargain effectively.  Union success in bargaining depends very much upon the credible threat
to impose losses on a recalcitrant employer by striking.  We next examine just how effective Japanese
unions have been in this regard.  
Bargaining and Strikes
Paradoxical as it might seem, the effectiveness of a union at extracting high r w ges for its
members cannot be judged by the frequency or duration of strikes.  The purpose of a strike is to
reveal the employer’s true willingness to pay a premium for the labor services of union members.  A
strike will occur whenever the union believes that an employer might be understating the size of that
premium.  And the strike will continue until the union is satisfied that the employer has admitted the
truth.  If the employer’s willingness to pay is already known by the union, a strike is unnecessary;
union and employer will reach an immediate accommodation with one another without a strike.
All of this can be made very precise.  Suppose that a union and employer are bargaining over
the wage the employer is to pay.  Suppose also that the value to the employer of the union’s labor
exceeds the non-union wage by some set amount v, and that the object of their bargaining is simply
what portion of that amount the employer pays in the form of a premium p in excess of the market
wage for nonunion labor.  The employer and union proceed by an alternating sequence of offers and
counteroffers.  Each round of bargaining is costly to both.  If the c sts are known to both, then the
first party makes an offer that the other is just sure to accept, that is, that would leave it just as well
off whether it accepts the offer or proposes the symmetric counteroffer.  For instance, if prolonging
the bargaining by one round imposes a cost of ) which is borne by the parties in proportion to their
respective shares of the gain from trade (each applies the discount factor 1-) i  determining the
present values of shares to be received one-period ahead), then the first party proposes terms that
imply its own share of the gain is 
   s=1/(2-)), 
and the other party accepts.  The reason? If the other party declines the offer, it can propose a
symmetric offer in the next round, which would confer on it a share, net of costs of having prolonged
the bargaining for a round, equal to 
     8By similar reasoning detailed in the appendix, if the costs of delaying agreement differ between
the two parties (but are still proportionate to their respective ultimate shares of the gain), then the
initial offer, which the second party accepts, equals
   s1=)2/()1+)2-)1)2),
where 1-)i represents the discount factor of partyi.   In other words, for either, the share obtained
becomes larger, the greater is the opposite party’s cost of prolonging bargaining.  This reasoning was
first developed by: Ariel Rubenstein, “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Eco ometrica, vol.
50, no. 1, 1982, pp. 97-109. 
     9Models like the one sketched here are discussed at length in the following excellent survey: John
Kennan and Robert Wilson, “Bargaining and Private Information”, Journal f Economic Literature,
vol. 31, March 1993, pp. 45-104. Also refer to: Peter C. Cramton, “Delay in Bargaining with Two-
Sided Uncertainty,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 59, no. 1, January 1992, pp. 205-225.
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   s-)s=(1-))/(2-)), 
that is, exactly the share it receives if it accepts the initial offer:
   1-s=1-1/(2-)).
In the limit as ) grows small (for instance, as each round of bargaining takes less time), s approaches
1/2: They divide the gain equally.8  The union and employer agree immediately on a union wage
premium: p=v/2.  There is no strike.  Yet even in this case, the threat of a strike is crucial to the
outcome.  If, instead of an open-ended bargaining process as just described, the bargainers are limited
to just one round of offers, after which failure to agree means that neither party realizes any gain from
trade, then the party that makes the last offer secures all of the gain.  A regime that allows employer
lockouts but disallows strikes, in effect, limits bargaining to a single round and confers the right of
last offer on the employer.  The employer makes a single take-it-or-leave-it offer and captures the
entire gain from employing the incumbent workers rather than others.  This  roughly describes the
industrial relations regime of Japan prior to World War I, in which strikes resulted in the incarceration
of union members, and the threat of a strike therefore generally lacked credibility.  But what about
Japan’s current industrial relations regime in which strikes are allowed? Strikes, although somewhat
rare, do nevertheless occur.  An extension of the previous example reveals why.9
Suppose that although the employer, of course, knows its own maximum willingness to pay
a premium for union labor (rather than do without altogether), the union does not know it; the true
value of v is private knowledge of the employer.  To keep matters simple, suppose that, initially, the
union knows only that v lies in an interval (v,&).  In this case, by prolonging bargaining (allowing a
strike to continue), the employer “signals” that the true value of v is low.  To put it another way, as
time elapses without agreement, the union infers that the true value of v must be lower than it had
previously hoped and continually revises its wage offer downward.  Upon some reflection, the
following will be seen to represent optimal decisions by both union and employer, each given the
respective choice of the other.  The union’s initial wage offer is a wage premium p=&v/2. As time
elapses without agreement, the union continually revises its wage offer downward so that 
   p=(1/2)&ve-rt,
where t is the elapsed time and r is the continuous discount rate (for example, &ve-rt happens to be the
discounted present value of amount &v to be realized t periods hence).  If the true value of v lies at the
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high end of the interval, the employer can do no better than accept the initial offer, and does so.  But
if the true value of v lies below &v, the employer holds out until the union wage offer has declined to
the point that it divides the true gain from trade equally between them.  Then it accepts the offer and
the strike ends.
The union and employer reason as follows.  If the union wage offer is continually revised
downward (“decays”) at the same rate as the employer’s time rate of discount, then the employer will,
at any given instant, reject the current offer if it leaves the employer with less than half of the true gain
from trade.  The reason? With this particular decay rate, if the wage offer of a given instant leaves
the employer with less than half of the gain, then the onerousness of postponing realization is more
than offset by the ensuing downward revision of the union’s wage offer.  And precisely because the
employer calculates in this manner, the union can do no better for itself than by, in fact, allowing its
wage offer to decay at exactly the same rate as the time rate of discount (its own and the employer’s,
here presumed to be identical).  A faster decay rate might hasten agreement but at too high a cost to
the union, and a slower decay rate might ultimately leave the union with a larger share but would take
too long to be worthwhile.  Furthermore, the union’s initial wage offer should be one that the
employer accepts only if the true gain is at the top of the interval, for any lower initial offer would
needlessly sacrifice the potential advantages to the union of ultimate discovery of the truth, and any
higher offer would be sure to be rejected.
The upshot of all this is quite simple.  A strike will occur only if the employer’s maximum
willingness topay a premium for union labor is known only to it.  Also strikes will last longer, the
greater the discrepancy between the employer’s maximum willingness to pay for union labor, and the
union’s initial perception of how high the employer’s maximum willingness to pay might be.
Small Percentage of Total Working Time Lost Due to Strikes in Japan
  
Strikes are rare events in all of the developed nations, but particularly so in Japan.  Table 4
describes the incidence, duration and costliness of strikes in Japan and a few other countries.  Only
seventeen in ten-thousand employees were ven involved in strikes in Japan in 1992, slightly more
than in the U.S. but significantly less than in the other nations.  Furthermore, the mean duration of
strikes was much less in Japan than in the U.S. in that year, two days in Japan compared to three
weeks in the U.S..  The percent of total working time lost due to strikes in Japan in 1992 was a mere
0.002 percent, much lower than in any other nation listed in the table, including the U.S..
     10The fact that wage negotiations in Japan are synchronous imparts a degree of flexibility to wage
contracts hat would not be present if the contracting periods were staggered, as is typical of the U.S..
With staggered contracts, if workers in one enterprise or industry previously over-predicted the price
level, so that their real wage rate is higher than they had intended, this will increase the demand for
labor in rival enterprises or industries, and prompt their employees to seek higher wages, too, when
their current contracts expire.  Synchronicity assures that if workers in one enterprise or industry
over-predict the price level, so that their real wage rate is higher than they had intended, then at least
it will not have influenced the real wage in rival firms or industries producing substitute products.
The employment effect of such errors will accordingly be attenuated by the synchronicity of labor
agreements.  This line of argument is developed in some detail by: Stanley Fischer, “Long-term
contracts, Rational Expectations and the Optimal Money Supply Rule”, Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 85, 1977, pp. 191-205; and John B. Taylor, “”Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts”,
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 88, 1980, pp. 1-23.
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Table 4.  Strikes in Japan and selected other Nations, 1992
Percent of total Incidence (percent mean duration
Working time lost of total employed) (days)
JAPAN 0.002  0.17  2.1
United Kingdom 0.01  1.5  1.7
France 0.01  0.02 13.9
U.S.(1993) 0.014  0.15 21.4
Germany 0.02  2.0  2.6
Canada (1993) 0.02  0.73  7.8
Italy 0.05 14.7  0.9
Note.  Canada excludes strikes involving fewer than 500 workers; US excludes
strikes  involving fewer than 1000 workers or lasting less than half of a working
day; Japan excludes strikes lasting less than half a working day.
sourc e: Randall K. Filer, Daniel S. Hamermesh, and Albert Rees, The Economics of
Work and Pay ,  Harper Collins, sixth edition, 1996, Table 12.2, p.471. (Their
primary  source: International Labour Organization, Yearbook of Labour Statistics
(1994), tables 3 and 31)
In Japan, union labor contracts are nearly always for the upcoming year, and are negotiated
in the Spring each year, an event known as the Spring labor offensive or shuntÇ (short for: shun-ki
chin-ageru kyÇdÇ tÇsÇ, lit. the Springtime cooperative struggle to hike wages).  April is the beginning
of the annual school year in Japan, and also the time of accession of new graduates into jobs, and so
it is the logical month for concluding labor contracts.10  Beginning in 1955, a large number of
Japanese labor unions have attempted annually to cooperate with one another to coordinate the
timing and substance of their contract negotiations.  Only since then have the annual spring labor
negotiations been referred to as shuntÇ.  These annual displays of cooperation across unions have
actually achieved very little.  The locus of contract negotiation and strike activity in Japan is, quite
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emphatically, the enterprise.  Synchronicity of negotiations across enterprises did not require
cooperation, for it is more or less assured by the predominance of one-year contracts.  About half of
the strikes in Japan occur in the months leading up to the Spring offensive, February to May.  Most
other strikes tend to occur around the times bonuses are paid, mid-summer and December, and
involve disputes about the levels of bonus payments.
Careful readers of the previous sections will know that Japan’s infrequency and short duration
of strikes is a poor indication of the effectiveness of its labor unions at obtaining higher wages for
their members.  Really, the smallness of losses due to strikes in Japan means only that there is little
discrepancy between the unions’ and employers’ information regarding the employers’ maximum
willingness to pay a premium for union members’ services.  It does not necessarily mean that the
premium itself is small.  Enterprise union members in Japan mostly include the regular employees of
large firms, trained in company-specific skills and expectant of long ultimate tenures of service.
Compared to members of a typical industry-wide union in the U.S. orelsewhere, the members of a
Japanese nterprise union are relatively homogeneous and have had a longer time in which to observe
the behavior of their employer.  For both these reasons, it is quite natural to suppose that union
members in Japan should be relatively well-informed regarding their employers’ willingness to pay
a premium for their services.
Conclusion
The various labor laws enacted in Japan in the Occupation era, and still in effect today without
substantial mendment, did legitimize unions, both as bargaining units on behalf of the employees of
large companies ands political organizations, but prohibited strikes by public employees, and did
not lead to the establishment of valuable labor monopolies. The effective bargaining units in wage
negotiations in Japan are mostly enterprise unions, whose respective members are employees of a
given company.  This does not preclude their having succeeded in raising members' wages.  Industry
unions and craft unions are probably more effective than enterprise unions at monopolizing the supply
of labor, but unions can also create economic rents by providing valuable services related to labor
contracting.  And enterprise unions probably economize on the costs of negotiating and enforcing
labor contracts as well or better than industry or craft unions, particularly in Japan's large companies,
where long tenures of employment have become the norm since the 1950's.  The small amount of
working time lost due to strikes in Japan reflects the union workers’ very great accumulation of
information regarding their employers’ willingness to pay for their labor, under the lifetime
employment system.  It does not indicate that the threat to strike is a weak one in Japan.
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Appendix. The Rubenstein Bargaining Game
In this appendix we detail the logic of bargaining as developed by: Ariel Rubenstein, “Perfect
Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econometrica, vol. 50, no. 1, 1982, pp. 97-109.  This logic
provides the indispensable point of reference for understanding strikes by labor unions.
Suppose that two persons must decide how to divide a dollar.  The first proposes that he
himself receive some specific share, s1 say.  The second person, if he declines the original offer,
proposes a counteroffer in which he himself should receive some specific share, s2  say. And so on,
back and forth.  Each time an offer is declined, the two bargainers, i=1,2, each incur costs of delay
)i, proportionate to the respective share each ultimately receives.  That is, each applies the discount
factor (1-)i).  
Now, the unique subgame perfect solution to this game is the pair (s1, 2) r presenting the
share each proposes to allocate to himself whenever it is his turn to make an offer, for the situation
before each player is essentially unchanging whenever it is his turn to make an offer.  The bargaining
proceeds as follows:
    Player 1's Player 2's
Allocation      Allocation
One Net of Costs Net of Costs
Proposing:  of Delay:        of Delay:        
Player 1     s1                        1-s1
Player 2       (1-s2)(1-)1)             s2(1-)2)
Player 1       s1(1-)1)2 (1-s1)(1-)2)
2
....and so on, until an offer is accepted.
Consider the characteristics of s1 and s2.  Player 2's initial counteroffer must be the least
generous that it could expect player 1 to accept:
(1-s2)(1-)1) = s1(1-)1)
2.
In anticipation of such a counteroffer from player 2, player 1's initial offer is the least generous it can
expect player 2 to accept:
1-s1 = s2(1-)2).
Solving these two equations, we find that 
s1 = )2/()1+)2 -)1)2).
Player 1 proposes this allocation and the offer is  immediately accepted by player 2.  The implication
is that the share each obtains is larger, the greater is the opposite party’s cost of prolonging
bargaining.  Furthermore, the first to propose an offer (in the example here, player 1) holds an
advantage.  In the limit, as the costs of prolonging bargaining approach zero, while holding their ratio
to one another at an unchanging level (for instance, as the successive rounds transpire more rapidly),
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the “first-mover” advantage dissipates, but the respective costs of prolonging bargaining still influence
the outcome:
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